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The Dual-Faceted Federalism Framework and the
Derivative Constitutional Status of Local Governments
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the federal constitutional status of local governments? This
question, though capable of succinct and simple articulation, is one that
seemingly lacks a similarly short or simple answer. In fact, the question
is one that has bedeviled the United States Supreme Court for many
years, appearing most frequently—though sometimes only implicitly—in
those cases that have grappled with recurring questions of whether
particular constitutional restrictions place limitations on the ability of
states to freely structure their local governments.1 This grappling has
often led to facially inconsistent results.2
One important commentator, Professor Briffault, has highlighted
these apparent facial inconsistencies by identifying three facially distinct
conceptualizations of local governments appearing in Supreme Court

1. The Supreme Court has also examined the federal constitutional status of local
governments in the related context of determining whether certain benefits to which states are
entitled under the federal constitution (e.g., sovereign immunity protection) are applicable to local
governments. These cases are not explored in depth in this Comment, but current sovereign
immunity jurisprudence is arguably consistent with the descriptive framework proposed by this
Comment. However, a normative analysis of whether sovereign immunity should appropriately
extend to municipalities is outside the scope of this Comment. For an article comprehensively
treating this topic, see generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions be Accorded
Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 577 (1994).
2. See discussion infra Part II. There are two principal types of cases in which the Court has
repeatedly been asked to grapple with this issue: first, cases in which local governments assert that
they are entitled to constitutional protections from state attempts to interfere with their internal
management, see, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923), and second, cases in
which it is alleged that the state’s choice to structure its local governmental entities in a certain
manner has led to the deprivation of personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution, see, e.g.,
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). It could be asserted that there is really no distinction at
all between these two types of cases because both categories of cases involve allegations that states
are restricted by personal rights in their ability to freely structure municipalities. That is, even under
the first principal category of cases, it could be asserted that alleged restrictions stem from the fact
that stakeholders in such governments allegedly obtain vested rights in the existence and functioning
of the established local government that might be infringed by later state action interfering with that
local government. Nevertheless, given that the Court has generally been less solicitous of assertions
that local governments are entitled to protections from state attempts to interfere with their operation
and functioning, it probably makes more sense to maintain the distinction between the two types of
cases.
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opinions that have examined the federal constitutional status of such
entities.3 First, some of these cases portray local governments as mere
instrumentalities of the state, with no independent status in the federal
constitutional hierarchy.4 Second, other cases conceptualize local
governments as independent polities, entitled to some independent
recognition in the constitutional hierarchy.5 Finally, other cases seem to
view certain local governments as quasi-proprietary firms, much akin to
private business corporations.6
Briffault’s observation of this inconsistency raises several
fundamental questions. First, is there a rationalizing principle underlying
these decisions at all, or are these inconsistencies simply a result of the
Supreme Court’s ad hoc approach?7 Second, if there is a rationalizing
principle, what is the principle and how does it functionally operate?
Finally, if there is a rationalizing principle, what does this rationalizing
principle suggest about the federal constitutional status of local
governments? I attempt to answer the first two questions, with the
primary aim of being better able to answer the third.
In this Comment, I explain that there is an implicit rationalizing
principle underlying relevant Supreme Court precedent: a presumption of
federalism.8 I further explain that each of Briffault’s three
3. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 68–69 (7th ed. 2009).
4. See id. at 70–98.
5. See id. at 98–146.
6. See id. at 147–73.
7. Briffault himself argues that the Court has, in an attempt to protect the “values of
federalism,” moved toward a conceptualization that views local governments more like independent
polities entitled to some recognition in the constitutional hierarchy. See Richard Briffault, “What
About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1303, 1311–17 (1994).
8. Given that the term “federalism” is concededly susceptible to more than one possible
construction, it is helpful to explain what I mean when I refer to the “presumption of federalism”
within this Comment. Justice O’Connor, writing for the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
explained that the Constitution established a “federalist structure of joint sovereigns” designed to,
through “a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal government,” “reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). In this system, “the States
possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 457 (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)).
Federalism deals with the “proper balance [of power] between the States and the Federal
Government.” Id. at 459. Consistent with these statements, I use the term “presumption of
federalism” in this Comment to refer to the notion that the states should be free to make decisions
relating to the “structure of [their local] government[s],” id. at 460, without meddling from external
sources—including Congress and the federal courts—because it is only through providing states
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“conceptualizations” of municipalities is really nothing more than a
consistent manifestation of the interaction between supremacy and the
presumption of federalism in the Court’s jurisprudence.
While it is likely obvious—and certainly not novel—to suggest that
federalism plays a role in the Court’s local government jurisprudence,
this Comment contributes to the relevant scholarship by proposing a new
framework that better explains federalism’s actual role. The Comment
notes that federalism plays dual roles, both (1) limiting the likelihood
that the Court will find that a state’s choices about structuring its local
governments are constitutionally impermissible9 and (2) leading the
Court to tailor its remedies as narrowly as possible in order to produce
minimal disruption where it finds that a state has run afoul of particular
constitutional prohibitions in structuring its local governments. Thus,
federalism limits the extent to which the supremacy of federal law
interferes with a state’s choices about how to structure its local
governments.

with this freedom that “a State defines itself as a sovereign,” id. Thus, in using the term federalism, I
am not referring to the assertion—advanced by certain scholars—that federalism refers to a group of
“values” that are relatively better advanced by greater decentralization of government. See, e.g.,
Briffault, supra note 7, at 1303–05 (explaining that “[c]ontemporary legal discourse concerning
federalism ha[d] shifted from the formal to the normative, that is, from a focus on the fifty states as
unique entities in the American constitutional firmament to a concern with the values of federalism”
and noting that “[i]n this way, federalism tends to become merely an emphatic way of speaking of
decentralization—a rhetorical trope with special resonance in American history and law—without
any particular application to the states”); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local
Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 961–62 (2007) (“The Court in its
modern federalism jurisprudence has built a largely instrumental case for devolving and
decentralizing governmental power. This vision of federal structure privileges state sovereignty in
order to promote efficiency and intergovernmental competition, check governmental tyranny, draw
on pluralism and the experimental values of decentralized governance, and reinforce community and
democratic participation. These core instrumental concerns are served even more forcefully by
enhancing the autonomy of local governments. Thus, the very values of federalism that the Court
invokes to enhance state sovereignty provide a compelling case for the particular exercise of federal
authority represented by cooperative localism . . . .”).
9. While this principle has generally heretofore only been implicit in those cases that have
directly examined constitutional limitations on a state’s ability to freely structure its municipal
governments, the Court’s reticence to place limits on a state’s ability to freely control and structure
its municipal governments has been recognized more explicitly in the related context of determining
the applicability of federal legislation to state and local government entities, where the Court has
imposed the super-strong clear statement canon from Gregory v. Ashcroft. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun.
League, 541 U.S. 125, 140–41 (2004) (involving a determination by the Court that a federal
enactment did not apply to local governments where applying the enactment to the Missouri
municipality at issue in the case would have granted it a power that the state did not wish for it to
have).
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Finally—and most importantly—this Comment also considers the
implications of its proposed framework. It explains that recognition of
federalism’s dual-faceted role is valuable for four reasons. First, this
recognition will likely allow for modestly improved predictability of the
outcome of future cases. Second, and of primary importance for purposes
of this Comment, this recognition suggests that scholars who have
identified a trend toward greater Supreme Court recognition of the
independent importance of local governments have missed the mark10:
any status afforded to local governments in the Court’s jurisprudence is
merely derivative of their status as creations of the sovereign states.
Third, it indicates that because the Court has heretofore only implicitly
suggested that it views the status of local governments as derivative, as
opposed to being independent or nonexistent, the Court should improve
the clarity of its relevant jurisprudence by explicitly articulating the role
federalism plays in its local government decisions, thus clarifying the
derivative status of local governments. Finally, although this Comment
does not normatively critique the implications of the Court’s choice to
conceptualize local governments as enjoying only derivative status in the
constitutional hierarchy, this observation should facilitate future
scholarly assessment of the normative defensibility of the Court’s
jurisprudence.
The main body of this Comment proceeds in five parts, including
this introductory part. Part II briefly provides illustrative examples of
each of Briffault’s three conceptualizations of local governments from
the Supreme Court’s key, past local-government jurisprudence,
illustrating the tensions between these conceptualizations. The point of
this exercise is simply to illustrate the tensions that exist in the Court’s
jurisprudence, not to exhaustively catalog the Court’s relevant
jurisprudence. Part III then explores some of the prior scholarly work
that has attempted to explain the Supreme Court’s facially confusing
jurisprudence. Part IV—the principal portion of this Comment—then
presents this Comment’s suggested dual-faceted, descriptive federalism
framework and suggests that the framework allows for the rationalization
of the Supreme Court’s precedents as a descriptive matter, providing
relevant application examples. Part V concludes by very briefly setting
forth the implications of the proposed framework, suggesting that—if
correct—the framework presented by this Comment suggests local

10. See discussion infra Part III.
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governments merely enjoy derivative status in the Court’s jurisprudence
but leaving a critique of whether the Supreme Court’s failure to afford
greater independent status to local governments is normatively defensible
until another day.
II. PRIOR SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE EXAMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF STATE SUBDIVISIONS
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court’s cases examining the
constitutional status of local governments have often appeared to be
facially inconsistent. Briffault’s widely used casebook on state and local
government highlights this facial inconsistency by presenting examples
of three, apparently distinct, conceptualizations for local governments.
Below, this Part of the Comment provides case examples fitting within
each of Briffault’s three conceptualizations in order to showcase the
apparent inconsistency between these cases, thus illustrating the need for
the descriptive framework proposed in Part IV.
A. Local Governments as Mere Instrumentalities of the State
The first group of cases—those that conceptualize local governments
as mere instrumentalities of the states—trace their lineage to principles
enunciated in the seminal case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.11
There, the Court examined whether the New Hampshire legislature’s
attempts to change the composition of the Dartmouth College Board of
Trustees were permissible.
The Court ultimately concluded that Dartmouth College was a
private entity, not a subdivision of the state; consequently, the Court
further concluded that New Hampshire’s attempts to control the Board of
Trustees violated the Contracts Clause. But in reaching this
determination, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court also
provided instructive commentary on the result that would have obtained
if the Court had instead concluded that Dartmouth College was a local
government entity. Marshall noted that “the framers of the constitution
did not intend to restrain the states in the regulation of their civil
institutions, adopted for internal government.”12 He further explained:
If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it create a

11. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
12. Id. at 629.
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civil institution to be employed in the administration of the
government, or if the funds of the college be public property, or if the
state of New-Hampshire, as a government, be alone interested in its
transactions, the subject is one in which the legislature of the State may
act according to its own judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its
power imposed by the constitution of the United States.13

This quoted language is significant because it suggests that if an
entity is a “civil institution” or subdivision of the state, then the
Constitution does not place any restrictions on the choices the state may
make in structuring that entity.
The prototypical example of these principles at work is Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh.14 In Hunter, residents of the city of Allegheny,
Pennsylvania, brought suit in an attempt to stop the city of Pittsburgh
from swallowing Allegheny in a merger between the two cities.15 A
Pennsylvania state law permitted cities to merge with one another
pursuant to a popular vote of all citizens in the area that would be
affected by the proposed joining of the cities.16 A majority vote of the
combined citizenry of Pittsburgh and Allegheny had sanctioned the
proposed joining of the two cities.17 The citizens of Allegheny, who had
invested substantial amounts of time and effort into the infrastructure of
their city, believed that this joining of the two cities was unfair and
brought suit to stop the proposed merger. The Supreme Court was
unpersuaded by the residents’ challenge to the merger of the cities,
noting in very strong language that localities were nothing more than
subdivisions of the state.18 Therefore, given that Pennsylvania law had
sanctioned this joining of the two cities, the Court was uninterested in
examining the propriety of the state’s choice. Thus, because the city of
Allegheny was viewed by the Court as an entity with no independent
status in the constitutional hierarchy, Hunter provides a perfect example

13. Id. at 629–30.
14. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
15. Id. at 174.
16. Id. at 174–75.
17. Id.
18. E.g., id. at 178–79 (“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may
be entrusted to them . . . . [T]he State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to
the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the
United States.”).
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of Briffault’s first conceptualization of municipalities.19
B. Local Governments as Independent Polities
Unlike Hunter and other analogous precedent, a number of other
Supreme Court cases instead appear to view local governments
as entities with some independent status in the federal constitutional
hierarchy—consistent with Briffault’s second conceptualization.
One segment of the Supreme Court’s local government jurisprudence
that has often seemed to adopt Briffault’s second conceptualization of
local government entities is the Court’s one-person, one-vote
jurisprudence. By imposing one-person, one-vote requirements on local
governments, many of these cases have implicitly rejected the notion that
municipalities are only subdivisions of the state, created for the state’s
convenience. If municipalities were no more than subdivisions of the
state, then reason would suggest that the states should be afforded nearly
absolute discretion in their decisions about establishing and ordering
these local governments. There would be no need for judicial policing of
state arrangements for local governments because adequate recourse for
state choices about ordering local governments could be had through

19. This conceptualization of municipalities has also appeared in a number of other cases.
For example, in Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923), the Court reviewed New Jersey’s
attempt to collect a license fee for water that the City of Trenton was diverting from the Delaware
River. New Jersey had passed a law in 1907 requiring the payment of such fees. However, the City
of Trenton claimed that it was not required to pay the fee required by this law because it had
acquired the right to divert water by purchasing it from a private company, and this company had
been authorized by an 1852 act of the New Jersey legislature to take this water from the river
perpetually and without paying a licensing fee. Thus, the argument went, given that the City of
Trenton was the successor and assign to this contract between New Jersey and the predecessor
private water company, New Jersey should not be permitted to charge this fee. The Court, though, in
a unanimous opinion, rejected the City of Trenton’s argument. The Court reasoned that although the
City was an assign of the private company, “[t]he relations existing between the State and the water
company were not the same as those between the State and the City.” Id. at 185. Whereas the
company, that had been “organized . . . for pecuniary profit,” had “rights and property [that] were
privately owned and therefore safeguarded by the constitutional provisions” that were asserted by
Trenton, “[t]he City [was] a political subdivision of the State, created as a convenient agency for the
exercise of such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to it.” Id. at 185–86.
Therefore, “[i]n the absence of state constitutional provisions safeguarding” the City, Trenton, had
“no inherent right of self-government which [was] beyond the legislative control of the State.” Id. at
187. Consequently, the state was free to “withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it
[saw] fit. However great or small [a local government’s] sphere of action, it remains the creature of
the State exercising and holding powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will.” Id.
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state political processes. Nonetheless, the Court, in a number of cases,
has chosen to impose one-person, one-vote requirements directly on
various local governments.20 Thus, the Court has suggested that it views
these governments as having some sort of independent status as polities
within the constitutional hierarchy, thereby justifying interference with
the states’ choices about structuring these local governments.
Although many of the Court’s cases that have apparently adopted

20. For example, in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the Court examined the
county government established for a small county in West Texas and chose to impose one-person,
one-vote requirements in county elections. The plaintiff, a resident and voter in these elections,
asserted that his Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by the manner in which county
election districts—used to elect the Commissioners Court, the governing body of the county—had
been drawn. The Commissioners Court of Midland County was the five-member governing body for
the county. While one of the five members was elected based on a popular vote of the entire county,
the other members were elected from four election districts. One of these election districts had a
population of 852, another had a population of 414, another had a population of 828, and the district
in which the plaintiff lived had a population of 67,906. Although the Court referred to the County as
a “subdivision” of the State, the Court nevertheless imposed one-person, one-vote on the County
government, rejecting the argument that proper apportionment of the state legislature made
apportionment at the local government level irrelevant. See id. at 479–80. The Court noted that the
Commissioners Court engaged in “much policy and decisionmaking” and that it had “power to make
a large number of decisions having a broad range of impacts on all the citizens of the county.” Id. at
481, 483.
Consequently, the Avery Court determined, it made sense to impose the one-person, one-vote
requirement in this case. Nonetheless, though, the Court attempted to cautiously articulate and limit
the overall scope of its holding. The Court noted that “[w]e hold today only that the Constitution
permits no substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of local
government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the
body,” id. at 484–85, and that the Court was very aware of the “greatly varying” problems faced by
local governments and did not want to place a “uniform straitjacket” on the ability to “devis[e]
mechanisms of local government suitable for local needs and efficient in solving local problems,” id.
at 485. As examples of the flexibility it had previously afforded in structuring governments, the
Court cited to two prior decisions, Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967) (sustaining
against one-person, one-vote challenge, “a procedure for choosing a school board that placed the
selection with school boards of component districts even though the component boards had equal
votes and served unequal populations”), and Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967) (involving a case
where the Court had allowed “Virginia Beach to choose its legislative body by a scheme that
included at-large voting for candidates, some of whom had to be residents of particular districts,
even though the residence districts varied widely in population”), where the Court had chosen not to
impose one-person, one-vote requirements on other local government elections. But see Board of
Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690 (1989) (The Court later chose to impose one-person, one-vote
on a New York City body of elected officials lacking general authority to legislate. While some
members of the governing board were elected on a city-wide basis, other members were elected from
each borough, such that certain individuals had far greater voting power than others.). Professor
Briffault has exhaustively catalogued the one-person, one-vote cases, as they relate to local
governments. See generally Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and
Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1993).
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Briffault’s second conceptualization of local governments have been
one-person, one-vote cases, these cases do not stand alone. The Milliken
case,21 presented below as the primary example of Briffault’s second
conceptualization, is not a one-person, one-vote case. I utilize Milliken
because it serves to effectively illustrate the tension between the different
conceptualizations.
Milliken involved a claim that the Detroit metropolitan area school
districts had engaged in impermissible racial discrimination.22 The
plaintiffs sought a remedy that would span the entire metro area.
Nevertheless, the Court, though finding a violation within the Detroit
School District, still refused to extend the busing remedy sought beyond
the Detroit School District, noting that there was no evidence that the
state itself had engaged in purposeful discrimination in the drawing of
district lines.23 Thus, even though it arguably would have been more
effective to ignore the school district all together, creating a
metropolitan-area-wide remedy, the Court chose not to ignore the school
district. Thus, the Milliken Court appeared to view the school district as
an independent polity entitled to some status and recognition within the
constitutional hierarchy.24
C. Local Governments as Quasi-Proprietary Firms
A third and final group of Court cases appears to conceptualize local
government entities as quasi-proprietary firms—Briffault’s third
typology.
A prototypical example is Ball v. James,25 which involved the
Court’s examination of whether one-person, one-vote should apply to the

21. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
22. Id. at 722.
23. Id. at 745. Justice White’s dissent disagreed and would have imposed a metropolitanarea-wide remedy. Id. at 762–64 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White criticized the Court strongly
for “draw[ing] the remedial line at the Detroit school district boundary, even though the Fourteenth
Amendment is addressed to the State and even though the State denies equal protection of the laws
when its public agencies, acting in its behalf, invidiously discriminate.” Id. at 771–72. White later
continued, “[t]he actions of the State itself directly contributed to Detroit’s segregation. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the State is ultimately responsible for the actions of its local agencies. And,
finally, given the structure of Michigan’s educational system, Detroit’s segregation cannot be viewed
as the problem of an independent and separate entity. Michigan operates a single statewide system of
education, a substantial part of which was shown to be segregated in this case.” Id. at 797.
24. Id. at 741–46, 752–53.
25. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
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Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (“Power
District”). The Power District was an Arizona entity created to provide
irrigation water to the owners of land in central Arizona, which financed
its operations by providing utility services to hundreds of thousands of
Phoenix-area residents. The Power District limited voting to those who
owned land to which it supplied water, with the grant of the franchise
being proportional to the acreage owned by individuals. The Power
District enjoyed a variety of governmental powers, including the right
“to condemn land, to sell tax-exempt bonds, and to levy taxes on real
property.”26
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately concluded that one-person, onevote restrictions should not apply to the entity, noting that (1) the Power
District exercised only limited governmental authority, which did not
include “such normal functions of government as the maintenance of
streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare
services”;27 (2) the water distributed by the Power District was
“distributed according to land ownership” such that the entity was only
of “nominal public character”;28 (3) the “provision of electricity [was]
not a traditional element of governmental sovereignty”; and (4) the
“relationship between [the nonvoting individuals who purchased power
from the Power District] and the [Power] District’s power operations
[was] essentially that between consumers and a business enterprise from
which they buy.”29 Together, these considerations influenced the Court
to conclude that the operations of the Power District had a
“disproportionately greater” effect on those landowners who had been
given the right to vote.30 Thus, because the Court believed the Power
District was more similar to a private business entity than a
governmental entity, the Court concluded that constitutional
restrictions—one-person, one-vote—that it had imposed on other general
purpose local government entities should not apply to the Power District.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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D. Paradigm Tension Between the Conceptualizations: Milliken and
Hunter
Although tension exists between all three of Briffault’s
conceptualizations—and all three are addressed by this Comment’s
proposed framework in Part IV—outright inconsistency between the
conceptualizations is best revealed by comparing the first and second
conceptualizations. Comparing Hunter and Milliken illustrates this
inconsistency. Recall that in Hunter, the city of Allegheny was viewed as
an entity lacking independent status in the constitutional hierarchy,31
whereas in Milliken the Court appeared to view the school district at
issue as an independent actor entitled to some status in the constitutional
hierarchy.32
These cases appear facially inconsistent in their conceptualizations
of the constitutional status of local governments. If local governments
are only subdivisions of the state, as they were found to be in Hunter,
then there is no reason why the Court should have avoided imposing a
metropolitan-area-wide remedy in Milliken; after all, school district lines
would not matter for constitutional purposes if the only relevant
constitutional actor was the State. Nonetheless, the Court—somewhat
enigmatically—respected the existence of the local government in
Milliken, while apparently discounting the importance of the local
subdivision in Hunter. These apparent inconsistencies, however, can be
reconciled using this Comment’s proposed, dual-faceted, presumptionof-federalism framework. Nevertheless, before presenting this
framework, I briefly survey some of the scholarship that has previously
attempted to reconcile the Court’s relevant jurisprudence.
III. SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY REGARDING THE STATUS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
Although the primary purpose of this Comment is to present and
defend this Comment’s proposed framework—which I do in Part IV—it
is instructive to first survey some of the prior scholarly work that has
attempted to provide a principled description for the apparently
inconsistent Court precedent described above in Part II.
Quite a few scholars have pointed out the inconsistent manner in

31. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
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which the Court has often treated local governments.33 Some of these
scholars have also attempted to explain these apparent inconsistencies.
For example, some scholars, including Richard Briffault, have
suggested that the apparent inconsistency among Court cases might stem
from paradigm shifts in Court thinking about federalism over time.34
This view suggests that the cases are inherently inconsistent with one
another and cannot be reconciled without the aid of different
paradigmatic lenses.
Specifically, Briffault has argued that the Court’s jurisprudence may
appear confused because the Court has tried to promote the “values
associated with federalism.”35 He has argued that this focus has led to
excessive promotion of local government action and interest, further
arguing that “[t]he [proper] role of the courts is to protect the formal
features of the federal structure . . . . The Constitution provides for and
33. See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Tribe’s City: Self-Government, The
Constitution, and a New Urban Age, 42 TULSA L. REV. 811, 815 (2007) (“[A]t various times, courts
have seized upon radically different legal conceptions of what a city is. Because the city has been a
legal enigma, lawyers representing it cannot restrict their field of vision to the technical doctrines
and specific regulatory provisions that bear directly on a discrete dispute over city power. They also
must attend to the deeper conceptual choices that such disputes inevitably pose. While courts
sometimes conceive of cities as if they are no different from any other level of government, that is
not always the case. Sometimes they question whether it is right to think of cities as governments at
all. And even when they conclude cities are governments, they are often uncertain whether to
classify them as political subdivisions of their states or as independent democratic polities in their
own right. A lawyer for a city, then, confronts some basic questions about what a city is.”); Richard
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1841, 1845–46 (1994) (explaining that “legal analysis oscillates between two contradictory
conceptions of local political space.” One of these conceptions “regards local jurisdictions as
geographically defined delegates of centralized power, administrative conveniences without
autonomous political significance.” The other conceptualization views them as “autonomous entities
that deserve deference because they are manifestations of an unmediated democratic sovereignty.”);
Joseph P. Viteritti & Gerald J. Russello, Community and American Federalism: Images Romantic
and Real, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 683, 688, 742 (1997) (repeatedly suggesting that community
government has “ambiguous and weak legal standing under our federalist system”); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel, Premature Predation, and the Components of
Political Identity, 50 VAND. L. REV. 445, 454 (1997) (suggesting there was tension between the
“series of cases arising early in the twentieth century” in which “the Supreme Court held that
municipalities and citizens thereof had no constitutional status” and some later cases “in which the
Court extended the right to vote to municipal elections”); Brian P. Keenan, Note, Subdivisions,
Standing and the Supremacy Clause: Can a Political Subdivision Sue its Parent State Under Federal
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1902 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s local government jurisprudence
is riddled with “seemingly conflicting precedents” and explaining that this has “produced confusion
in the federal circuit courts of appeals when a political subdivision sues its parent state”).
34. Cf. Briffault, supra note 7, at 1311–12, 1328–35.
35. Id. at 1306.
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protects the formal aspects of the states’ existence, not the values
conventionally ascribed to federalism.”36 Briffault suggests that the
change in the Court’s jurisprudence is a result of the “ero[sion]” of
“some of the conceptual underpinnings that supported the traditional
view of the states as special” by “supplant[ing] to a significant degree the
common understanding that the United States was formed out of a
compact of the states” with “a historical account of the Constitution as a
compact of the people of the United States.”37 Briffault terms this
movement toward promoting local government “localist federalism,”
although cautioning that the Court still “continues to distinguish between
states and localities in a number of doctrinal settings.”38 He argues that
because “local governments have been distinguished from their states in
a sufficient number and variety of doctrinal settings . . . it would seem
that the normative values of local, as well as state, autonomy have been
subsumed into the definition of federalism.”39 He explains that this
doctrinal movement “can result in a paradox: the use of the values of
federalism to undermine a traditional tenet of federalism—the states’
power to determine the structure and powers of their local
governments.”40 Briffault argues that this emerging jurisprudence
ignores fundamental differences between the important federal
constitutional status of states and the nonexistent status of local
government entities.41
Similarly, Professor Nicholas S. Zeppos asserts that the Court’s
jurisprudence has shifted over time, explaining that although early cases
seemed to conceptualize municipalities as mere subdivisions of the states
that created them, some later cases (e.g., one-person, one-vote cases)
appear to conceptualize them as important, independent actors entitled to
certain recognition in the constitutional hierarchy. Furthermore, despite

36. Id.
37. Id. at 1309.
38. Id. at 1309–11, 1334.
39. Id. at 1334.
40. Id. at 1335.
41. Id. at 1335–44. Interestingly enough, although Briffault argues that the Court has
sometimes given local governments a measure of individual autonomy in an attempt to promote
local autonomy, some scholars have argued that traditional, dual-sovereign federalism is actually the
best model for promoting local autonomy. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for
Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 188 (2005). Other scholars,
though, strongly disagree. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 915–17 (1994).
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the Court’s “states’ rights revival,” which facially suggests that “the
Court would [not] have much interest in . . . embracing a conception of
federalism that recognizes more local government units and the
individual as a citizen of a municipality,” some more modern decisions
suggest that the Court has accepted the “political significance of . . . local
political-geographic lines.”42
Other scholars have carried Briffault’s concept of emerging localism
one step further, arguing that the Court has begun affirmatively granting
local governments a “realm” in which “local governments [are protected]
from contrary state commands.”43 These scholars have sometimes
labeled this recent empowerment of local government “constitutional
home rule,”44 arguing that the Court grants local governments such
power in order to protect “substantive constitutional rights.”45

42. See Zeppos, supra note 33, at 454–55. Other scholars appear to share views similar to
those held by Professors Briffault and Zeppos. For example, Mark C. Gordon observed, “Court
decisions have recognized the key role of localities without explicitly saying so. This is particularly
true when one considers the federalist values of local decisionmaking, citizen participation, and
responsiveness to diverse community needs, all of which occur far better on the municipal than on
the state level.” Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New
Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 218 (1996).
Professor Gordon, however, unlike Professor Briffault, believes that the Court’s increased
recognition of local government is normatively a positive thing and that the Court should be more
explicit in recognizing the important role of local governments. See id. at 218–19. Two other
scholars, Joseph P. Viteritti and Gerald J. Russello, also have argued that somewhat-analogous
values have become the motivating factor in the Court’s jurisprudence. They argue that the
“Court . . . connects the geographical boundaries of a locality with the power to create and support
the values held by those within it. Communities have the ability to preserve their own sphere of
values that represent the manner in which they choose to live.” Viteritti & Russello, supra note 33, at
714. Thus, for Viteritti and Russello, the Court’s changing recognition of community values
provides the rational principle that undergirds the Court’s relevant decisions, decisions which have
“imposed significant legal restraints on local governments” but have also led “the Supreme Court
[to] recognize[] that localities represent the values and interests of their constituents,” thereby
leading the Court to “provide[] some measure of autonomy for them to reflect their priorities in
law.” Id. at 710. Unlike Gordon, however, Viteritti and Russello do not view the Supreme Court’s
recognition of the importance of communities as a positive development, noting that “[t]o the extent
and on the occasions that communities have been granted discretion to enact public policy, these
collective enterprises have not on the whole exhibited an extraordinary level of civic virtue and
public spirit, and at times have necessitated corrective intervention from federal and state
authorities.” Id. at 742.
43. See Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 147, 152, 174 (2005).
44. Id. at 168.
45. See id. at 148, 178–80; see also David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of
Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 586–94 (1998–1999); Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer
v. Evans as the Transformation of Local Government Law, 31 URB. LAW. 257 (1999).
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In Part IV, I argue that these “emerging localism” scholars are
incorrect in suggesting that the Supreme Court’s recognition of local
governments means that the Court now views these governments as
having independent importance in the constitutional hierarchy.46 I
instead suggest that the Court’s jurisprudence can be explained by
recognizing that cities have only derivative significance in the
constitutional hierarchy, which is different than suggesting that they have
no importance at all but is also different than asserting that they have
independent significance.47 And this observation is important. Making it

46. As noted in Part IV, I disagree with these scholars’ assertion that there has been a shift in
the Court’s jurisprudence over time. Nevertheless, to the extent that I am incorrect in asserting that
there has not been a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, my thesis and proposed framework is still
relevant because this framework provides an alternate explanation for such a shift that attributes
more coherence to the Court’s jurisprudence. This is because, instead of asserting that the shift
towards localism stems from the Court’s attempts to promote the “values” inherent in federalism, my
framework would instead attribute such a shift to the Court’s more nuanced, modern attempts to
protect traditional, dual-sovereignty federalism. See supra note 8. That is, to the extent that the Court
now shows greater solicitude to local governments in certain instances than it once did, my
framework suggests the Court does so because—recognizing that local governments derive their
powers from the states that created them or put in place the mechanisms that allowed for their
creation—the Court recognizes that, in some instances, respecting local governments is important to
respect state decisions regarding the creation of these governments. Thus, even to the extent that my
conclusion that there has not been a shift in the Court’s relevant jurisprudence over time is not
correct, my framework is still relevant in suggesting that local governments only enjoy derivative,
not independent, status in the constitutional hierarchy.
47. Although I don’t discuss other relevant scholarship that examines and attempts to explain
the apparent inconsistency in the Court’s local government jurisprudence, I recognize that other
explanations have been advanced. For example, some scholars attempt to explain portions of the
Court’s local government jurisprudence without referencing federalism or explicitly recognizing that
cases involve local governments. James A. Gardner attempted to explain inconsistency in the
Court’s voting rights jurisprudence. Gardner concluded that the proper background principle for
explaining these decisions was a communitarian one—that is, that the Court’s voting rights
jurisprudence favors claims that are based on assertions that voters who are “members of the
relevant political community” are being deprived of the franchise. James A. Gardner, Liberty,
Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to
Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 910 (1997). Gardner also pointed out that other voting rights claims
generally fail where these claims are instead based on notions of “protective democracy”—that is,
whether individuals claim they are being remotely “governed by a political community different
from the one to which they belong[].” See id. at 910–11. Ultimately, Gardner explained that the
source of the Court’s apparently confused jurisprudence was its “fail[ure] to distinguish between the
two theories,” or its choices to “speak[] the language of one concept while acting according to the
other.” Id. at 982. Gardner suggests that the Court should fix its troubled jurisprudence by adopting a
“coherent political theory.” See id. at 985. Nevertheless, while interesting, such articles do not
contribute substantially to the overall dialogue relating to the appropriate constitutional status of
localities, since such articles focus directly on other topics, ignoring the nuance introduced into the
equation by local governments.
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allows me to propose a more cohesive explanation for the Court’s
jurisprudence than any prior scholar because the observation obviates the
need for accepting that the Court’s thinking about local governments has
shifted over time.
IV. DESCRIPTIVE DUAL-FACETED FEDERALISM FRAMEWORK
As highlighted above, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence related to
the federal constitutional status of local governments appears facially
inconsistent. And no prior scholar has yet been able to present a cohesive
framework that rationally explains how the Court views municipalities.
This section of the Comment attempts to provide such a descriptive
framework.
As explained earlier, federalism provides the unifying principle that
allows for rationalization of all the relevant cases—and permits the
development of this Comment’s proposed framework.48 That federalism
is the appropriate rationalizing principle is best illustrated by returning to
Milliken and Hunter. Although, as noted previously, in Hunter the Court
viewed the local government at issue (Allegheny) as a mere subdivision
of the state,49 while in Milliken the Court viewed the local government at
issue (Detroit School District) as an independent actor,50 a conclusion
that these cases are inconsistent with one another is erroneous. The cases
are actually consistent with one another when they are viewed against the
background norm of federalism. That is, the local government
conceptualization adopted by the Court in each of the two cases allowed
the state to have relatively free reign in structuring the relevant local
government as it saw fit.

Other commentators do not ignore the jurisprudential nuance introduced by local
governments, but focus exclusively on cases within one area of the Court’s local government
jurisprudence. For example, one student Comment attempted to rationally explain local government
suits directly against the states that created them. See generally Brian P. Keenan, Comment,
Subdivisions, Standing and the Supremacy Clause: Can a Political Subdivision Sue Its Parent State
Under Federal Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2004–2005). This student, in arguing that local
governments should be able to sue state governments in certain instances, argued that those prior
cases that had involved suits by local governments against the states that had created them could be
rationally explained simply by looking at the “[constitutional] clauses at issue in th[ose] cases.” Id.
at 1905. The problem with this approach, though, is that through its myopic focus on only one type
of case, it fails to answer the broader question of how the Court generally views local governments.
48. See supra note 8.
49. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
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In Hunter, because the state had adopted laws whereby the city of
Allegheny could be merged out of existence, the Court best respected the
will of the state by allowing the city to be merged. On the other hand, in
Milliken the state had chosen to create school districts and presumably
did not want the lines that it had allowed to be drawn on the map to be
ignored. So, to give effect to the state’s wishes, the Court had to respect
the existence of the school districts that the state had chosen to create,
although ignoring these school district boundary lines and imposing a
metropolitan-area-wide remedy might have allowed the Court to fashion
a more effective remedy.
This recognition that federalism seems to play a role in explaining
the results in Hunter and Milliken, though important, is not sufficient by
itself for two reasons. First, this bare recognition fails to provide a
principled framework into which other relevant cases could be inserted.
Second, this bare recognition fails to provide a nuanced description of
how federalism functionally operates in each of the two cases (and other
cases). In particular, this recognition ignores the fact that in Hunter the
Court found that there was no constitutional violation at all, thus
choosing not to provide any remedy whatsoever,51 whereas in Milliken
the Court found that there was a constitutional violation, yet chose to
impose a narrow remedy.52
The dual-faceted federalism framework proposed below does not
ignore either of these two important considerations.
A. Proposed Descriptive Framework
This Comment’s proposed dual-faceted federalism framework has
two prongs. These prongs operate in sequential fashion, with each prong
operating as a rebuttable presumption. The analysis under the first prong
(“Prong 1”) determines whether the state has violated the Constitution in
the structuring of its local governments, cautioning the Court against
finding a constitutional violation in the first instance. The analysis under
the second prong (“Prong 2”) determines the scope of the remedy that the
Court should impose in a circumstance where it finds a violation,
counseling the Court to minimally invade a state’s sovereign choices
even in those circumstances where the Court finds a constitutional
violation.
51. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–81 (1907).
52. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–46, 752–53 (1974).
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Given that my discussion of the details of the framework is relatively
complex, it is important that the reader maintain in mind my purpose for
presenting a nuanced description of the framework. The implications of
my proposed, two-part framework—if it is accurate—are relatively
straightforward. Particularly, my framework illustrates that local
governments enjoy only derivative status in the constitutional hierarchy.
That is, if federalism cautions the Court against even finding violations
in the state’s decisions about how to structure its municipalities, then in
cases where the Prong 1 presumption is not overcome, the result is
deference to the state’s choices about how to structure its municipalities,
whether the state made those decisions directly or indirectly by enabling
local governments to act in certain ways. This deference may or may not
require the Court to “recognize” the existence and importance of a
particular local government entity. Nevertheless, in either case the local
government entity has no “independent” status in the constitutional
hierarchy, acquiring whatever status it has derivatively from its maker
and its maker’s wishes regarding it.53
If, though, the Prong 1 presumption is overcome, then some
interference with the state’s decisions about how to structure its
municipalities is inevitable. Supremacy of federal law dictates as much.
Thus, the Prong 2 presumption comes into play. Nevertheless, under
Prong 2, the Court will still limit its remedy as much as possible to avoid
undue infringement of state sovereign prerogatives. The Court’s efforts
to avoid such interference can give the illusion that the local government
has independent constitutional status, because the Court generally limits
its remedy to the offending government. But the motivation underlying
the Court’s efforts is deference to the state’s decisions about how to
structure its municipalities. Thus, any “independent” constitutional status
is actually just derivative, derived from the state’s decisions about how to
structure its local government entities.
In rare instances, where the Prong 2 inquiry suggests that a state has
purposefully used its power to structure a local government in order to
deprive individuals of constitutionally guaranteed rights, the Court
simply disregards the particular, purposeful state action that led to the
deprivation of these rights. In these rare instances, the Court might

53. If local governments enjoyed “independent status” in the constitutional hierarchy, the
Court would instead be required to automatically take cognizance of these governments’ existence
and importance.
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actually ignore a state’s local government structuring decision, although
this result is not inevitable. That is, in circumstances where the particular
offending state decision involved the creation or modification of the
boundaries of a particular local government, by ignoring the
impermissible state decision, the Court might completely or partially
ignore that particular local government entity. On the other hand, where
the offending state decision instead dealt with either granting powers to
local government entities or limiting their powers, the Court’s decision to
disregard the state’s offending decision might instead lead to either an
augmenting or diminishing of local government powers, without leading
the Court to necessarily disregard the local government entity all
together. Thus, even in these circumstances, the status of local
governments is merely derivative, since they will only be completely
disregarded in those circumstances where the very act of creating or
modifying them represented an illegitimate exercise of state power.
Circumstances where the Prong 2 presumption is overcome are rare,
though, and the Court is reticent to ignore the state’s decisions about
ordering its local governments. Although, the Court is willing to do so
where such action is necessary in order to impose an effective remedy.
Such action in these limited circumstances is justified to preserve the
supremacy of federal law.
Therefore, in summary, in nearly all instances, the Court respects—
to some degree—the states’ choices about how to structure their local
governments, only completely disregarding the states’ choices where the
states have acted purposefully in violating constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Together, then, this framework suggests that any significance ever
afforded to local governments is only derivative, which in turn suggests
that local governments do not have independent constitutional status.
This explanation of the implications of my framework was presented
here to remind the reader not to get lost in the details of my presentation
of the framework, forgetting the purpose for which the framework is
presented. While the presentation of the framework will likely modestly
improve ability to predict the outcome of future cases, the primary reason
for presenting the nuanced discussion below is to convince the reader
that my two-pronged framework is correct as a descriptive matter,
because persuading the reader that my framework is adequate as a
descriptive matter is probably a necessary antecedent to persuading the
reader that this Comment’s conclusions about the federal constitutional
status of local governments—which, as shown by the discussion in the
foregoing paragraph, flow quite naturally from the simple presentation of
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the
dual pronged federalism presumption above—are descriptively accurate.
1. Framework Prong 1 – determining whether there is a violation
necessitating some remedy
The first prong of this framework—the more complex and
admittedly less determinative of the two parts—provides operational
content to federalism by limiting the likelihood that the Court will find
that a state’s choices about structuring its local governments are
constitutionally impermissible in the first instance, thereby minimizing
the number of judicial incursions upon state sovereignty.
This prong of the framework sets up a rebuttable presumption that
decisions a state makes about structuring its municipalities are
constitutionally permissible. While this principle appears relatively
simple on its face, the key complexity arises in identifying those factors
that are useful in predicting whether the first presumption has been
overcome in a particular case. The subsequent paragraphs attempt to
identify such factors.
In identifying these factors, it is useful to begin the inquiry by
identifying the key policy tension in the Court’s relevant jurisprudence.
Although often only implicit, the relevant cases show that the Court’s
precedent attempts to balance the competing values of federalism and
supremacy.54 Unfortunately, however, because the Court’s cases in this
area are nearly always comparative (e.g., the Court already applied oneperson, one-vote to one particular type of government entity, and now
54. This tension is more explicit in the related context of the Nixon clear-statement rule,
where the Court has explicitly imposed a clear-statement rule upon Congress for those times when it
attempts to interfere with the structure of local governments by providing such governments with
authority or power that the states did not choose to give to them. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League,
541 U.S. 125, 140–41 (2004). Arguably, whereas the Nixon clear-statement rule restrains the
legislative and executive branches in their attempts to infringe on state rights to structure local
government as the states see fit, the dual-pronged federalism presumption proposed by this
Comment similarly makes the other federal branch—the judiciary—take pause before interfering
with the mechanisms by which states have chosen to govern themselves. Like the Nixon clearstatement rule, the dual-faceted federalism check I propose in this Comment operates only as a
presumption, thereby preserving the supremacy of federal law. Both the Nixon rule and the clearstatement rule proposed by this Comment are manifestations of the tension between the federal and
state governments that Chief Justice John Marshall famously observed “is perpetually arising, and
will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 405 (1817).
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the Court is seeking to determine whether this same stricture should be
applied to another government entity), the Court’s use of prior precedent
obscures what otherwise would be the explicit resolution of the inherent
tension between these two values.
To determine what the Court’s analysis would look like if it were
forced to engage in this balancing inquiry directly—by explicitly
resolving the tension between supremacy and federalism—it is useful to
engage in a thought experiment. This thought experiment asks what
factors the Court would weigh if it were forced to explicitly confront the
tension between federalism and supremacy in a particular case without
the crutch of prior precedent upon which to rely. I propose that the
Court’s inquiry in such a world would likely have two principal aspects.
First, the Court would attempt to assess the extent to which a
fundamental right would be compromised by its failure to impose a
restriction in a particular case. In making this assessment the Court
would explicitly weigh (a) the relative importance, in the constitutional
rights pantheon, of the right that the petitioner alleges has been deprived,
and (b) the degree of encroachment upon this right that is actually
occasioned by the particular state municipality-structuring decision
before the Court.
Second, the Court would balance its determination under the first
aspect of the inquiry against an assessment of the degree of incursion
upon state sovereignty that would be occasioned by imposition of the
restriction.
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This theoretical inquiry (“Theoretical Inquiry”) suggests that a
relatively greater encroachment upon a relatively more important right
would be required for the Court to impose a restriction in a circumstance
where imposition of the restriction necessary to protect the right would
lead to a relatively greater encroachment upon state sovereignty.
Alternately, it suggests that a relatively lesser encroachment upon a
relatively less significant right would be required if imposition of such a
restriction would lead to a relatively more minimal incursion upon state
sovereignty.
The relationship between the three relevant factors in the Theoretical
Inquiry can be visualized by imagining a three-dimensional graph with
three axes (X, Y, and Z), any two of which are at perpendicular, ninetydegree angles from one another, and which intersect at a single point (the
“Origin”).55

The X axis would be labeled “relative importance of the right the

55. See Visualization of Cartesian Coordinates in Three Dimensions, THE UNIV. OF SYDNEY,
http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au/u/MOW/vectors/vectors-7/v-7-1.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2009).
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petitioner alleges has been deprived,” with the importance of the right
increasing in proportion to the distance away from the Origin. The Y axis
would be labeled “the degree of encroachment upon this right occasioned
by the state’s decision about how to structure its municipal government,”
with relative encroachment upon the right increasing in proportion to the
distance away from the Origin. The Z axis would represent the “degree
of incursion upon state sovereignty that would be occasioned by
imposition of the sought-after restriction,” with relatively greater
incursion on state sovereignty falling closer to the Origin. This imaginary
graph could be subdivided into two areas. The area closer to the Origin
would be called the “zone of federalism,” or the area within which
Courts would be unwilling to impose any sort of restriction on the state’s
structuring of its subdivisions to protect a particular right. Beyond this
zone, however, the remainder of the graph would be called the “area of
supremacy.” This area of supremacy would represent the area in which a
Court would be willing to impose some sort of restriction upon a state’s
ordering of a local government to protect a particular right. Any given
instance of encroachment upon a particular right would be represented by
a single point on the graph. The farther away from the Origin this point
fell, the greater the likelihood that it would fall within the “area of
supremacy.” However, because in each instance the process of plotting
would begin at the Origin and move outward, there would be a natural,
rebuttable presumption that, unless the relevant factors suggested
otherwise, the Court would not impose a restriction, because the zone of
federalism lies closer to the Origin.
When viewed in isolation, these insights available from the
Theoretical Inquiry and hypothetical graph above appear less than
impressive. Besides appearing somewhat obvious, the conclusions based
upon the Theoretical Inquiry almost appear completely useless, as a
practical matter. This is because the standards—such as “relative
importance” and “degree of encroachment”—that appear in the
Theoretical Inquiry and on the graph axes would, standing alone, provide
mostly rudderless and minimal—if any—predictive guidance.
Nonetheless, the Theoretical Inquiry and hypothetical graph are not
useless. Indeed, they become extremely useful when it is recalled that the
Court’s actual jurisprudence does not generally engage in a pattern of
inquiry that follows the pattern set forth in the Theoretical Inquiry.
Rather, the Court engages in a proxy for this inquiry that resolves the
inherent tension between federalism and supremacy implicitly through
the device of comparative precedent.
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In its basic form, the Court’s actual comparative inquiry asks a
question that is eminently more ascertainable than the questions posed by
the Theoretical Inquiry. It asks whether the Court’s prior precedents
justify imposing a particular restriction on the local government entity
that is before the Court. While this inquiry concededly lacks scientific
precision, it is not as completely rudderless as the bare Theoretical
Inquiry discussed above because it allows the prognosticator to take
guidance from earlier precedents, either distinguishing or analogizing to
earlier cases in which the Court has or has not imposed restrictions on
other municipalities.56 Nevertheless, standing alone, the comparative
standard is also a weak predictive tool, because it does not reveal which
factors are or should be relevant in making this comparison.
This is where the Theoretical Inquiry becomes instrumental. The
suggestion that the Court’s comparative precedential inquiry is merely a
proxy for the Theoretical Inquiry is extremely valuable because it
highlights that the Theoretical Inquiry can help identify which factors are
relevant in the Court’s comparative jurisprudence. That is, by using the
insights garnered from the Theoretical Inquiry as a paradigm for viewing
the Court’s actual comparative jurisprudence, we can hopefully identify
and extract those substantive factors that the Court uses in its
comparative analysis as proxy factors to approximate the “pure” analysis
under the Theoretical Inquiry. We can then use these factors to better
predict the outcomes of future comparative analyses by the Court,
because these factors should allow us to identify those distinctions
between cases that are relevant and those that are not. Thus, we can
assess the boundaries of the zone of federalism and area of supremacy on
our imaginary graph by comparative proxy.
We begin by turning to the first dimension of the Theoretical Inquiry
and asking which comparative proxy factors would be relevant in
determining “the extent to which a fundamental right would be
compromised by a failure to impose a restriction.”
Under the first element (the “X Axis” inquiry in our hypothetical
graph above) of the first dimension Theoretical Inquiry, we ask what
comparative factors would serve as effective proxies to help the Court

56. While it is possible to conceive of some cases in which earlier analogous precedents
might not provide meaningful guidance, such instances are likely to be quite rare given that,
generally, most of the Court’s jurisprudence within this area falls within only a few limited
categories (e.g., one-person, one-vote or Contracts Clause challenges). Thus, for the vast majority of
cases, prior precedent will likely provide significant guidance.
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implicitly ask the pure Theoretical Inquiry of “the relative importance, in
the constitutional rights pantheon, of the right that the petitioner alleges
has been deprived.”
Probably, the primary inquiry under this element is one that seeks to
determine whether the Court has already imposed restrictions on other
local governments to protect the particular right; such an imposition
suggests that, at least in some instances, supremacy might outweigh
federalism, thereby justifying imposition of a restriction. In instances
where the Court has not previously protected the same right, another
relevant inquiry is whether the Court has protected similar rights in the
past. In determining whether the Court has imposed similar restrictions,
the Court might compare the source of the alleged right with the source
of other rights for which the Court has previously imposed restrictions.
Unsurprisingly, the Court’s jurisprudence reveals that it is somewhat
more likely to impose restrictions upon the states based upon the
Reconstruction Amendments, because these Amendments were arguably
meant to impose restrictions that the states should not be able to subvert
through their local-government-ordering decisions.57 The Court’s
jurisprudence also indicates that the Court is more likely to impose a
restriction where the specific right violated is an individual right
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,58 instead of a right that a local
government asserts directly against the state.59 This also makes sense,
given that one of the purposes of federalism is to protect individual
rights.60 Consequently, federalism counsels interference much more
strongly in instances where individual rights are at stake, and, alternately,
counsels strongly against interference where cities claim rights under the
Constitution as against their makers, since the risk of undue interference

57. Cf., e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (suggesting that certain
constitutional provisions—including the Fifteenth Amendment—place greater restrictions on states
in the structuring of their local governments than others).
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
60. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363–64 (2011) (“The individual, in a
proper case, can assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that
federalism defines. Her rights in this regard do not belong to a State . . . . The limitations that
federalism entails are not therefore a matter of right belonging only to the States. States are not the
sole intended beneficiaries of federalism. An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that
upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States when the
enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to
principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate.”).
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with state sovereignty is at its greatest height in such instances.61
Moving on to the second element (the “Y Axis” inquiry in our
hypothetical graph above) of the first dimension of the Theoretical
Inquiry, we next ask what comparative proxies the Court uses to
implicitly ask the pure Theoretical Inquiry of the “degree of
encroachment upon the right that is actually occasioned by the particular
state decision about how to structure a municipality.” This inquiry
recognizes that not every assertion that a state has trammeled upon a
right—even an important right—establishes that the right has been
infringed. The primary proxy inquiry here is one that is more contextual
than the one discussed above, in the sense that it pays greater attention to
the particular type of government entity before the Court. Here, the
Court’s primary inquiry likely asks whether the Court has previously
imposed a restriction on a similar type of local government entity in
order to protect the right, or a similar right. In looking at its prior case
law, the Court might examine the extent of governmental power
exercised by the particular local government entity before the Court over
the petitioner vis-à-vis the governmental power exercised by other
entities upon the petitioners in those cases in which the Court has
previously imposed the same or similar restrictions. This inquiry
recognizes that local governmental entities with broad, general
governmental powers are more likely to be able to significantly impede
individual rights than those entities that exercise limited, insignificant
powers.62 Similarly, the Court would likely examine whether it had
previously imposed analogous restrictions on the states in order to
protect the asserted right, and would further ask whether failure to
protect the right at the local government level would make the right
guaranteed at the state level significantly less meaningful, since
supremacy counsels less interference in instances where the effective
substance of a right is already protected.63 Finally, the Court would

61. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“Through the structure of its
government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a
sovereign.”).
62. Compare City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (involving application of
one-person, one-vote to a bond election for a municipality that exercised broad powers) with Holt
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (choosing to not extend one-person, one-vote
to the extraterritorial residents of the contiguous zone outside of the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama,
noting that the city exercised relatively small amounts of governmental power in this contiguous
zone).
63. This might be the case where the Supreme Court has previously determined that a
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likely assess whether the record reveals that the state has acted more
purposefully in attempting to deprive individuals of the asserted right
than in other cases in which the Court has previously imposed
restrictions, recognizing the fact that federalism values are significantly
weakened where the states illegitimately use their power to purposefully
impede constitutionally guaranteed rights.64
We next turn to the second dimension of our Theoretical Inquiry (the
“Z axis” inquiry in our hypothetical graph above). We seek comparative
proxies for the Theoretical Inquiry that consider the “degree of incursion
upon state sovereignty that would be occasioned by imposition of the
restriction” upon a particular entity. Given that all federal impositions
trammel upon state sovereignty to some degree, examination of the cases
reveals that the only real comparative inquiry considers which particular
restrictions previously have been imposed upon the particular type of
local government entity before the Court.65 To the extent that the same
restriction has been imposed on the same type of local government entity
in the past, it suggests that the entity can survive imposition of such a
restriction. On the other hand, to the extent that the Court has not
imposed a similar restriction on this type of local government in the past,
it is necessary to examine where on the spectrum (ranging from
municipal government exercising a broad range of power to quasi-private
corporation financed publicly) of governmental entities the particular
local government falls, and compare this with other local governmental
entities upon which the Court has previously imposed such past

particular restriction applies to the states (e.g., need for relatively proportional apportionment in state
elections) and extension of the same restriction to municipal governments is necessary to
meaningfully protect the right (e.g., given that much power is exercised at the local level, arguably if
the Supreme Court had required relatively proportional apportionment in only state elections, but not
in local governmental elections, the meaningfulness of the right to equal vote in state elections
would be diminished, because states delegate much of their power to local governments). See, e.g.,
Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
64. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (imposing a remedy in a
circumstance where the state had purposefully drawn the lines of the city in order to exclude black
voters).
65. Thus, this proxy inquiry is quite similar to the “Y axis” inquiry above, in that it focuses
on particular restrictions vis-à-vis particular types of government entities. The difference in these
inquiries, though, stems from their focus. Whereas the “Y axis” inquiry focuses on the effect of the
particular restriction on a petitioner’s rights, the “Z axis” inquiry focuses on the effect of the
imposition of a restriction upon a particular local government that the state has chosen to create.
Thus, asking a fairly similar proxy question two times, yields multiple groups of insights.
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restrictions.66 If the Court has already imposed the same restriction on an
entity that is less like a general government and more like a private
entity, then we can confidently predict that the Court will likely impose
the restriction. To the extent it has not done so, the Court is less likely to
impose the restriction. This step in the inquiry allows the Court to
account for the fact that many types of quasi-governmental entities that
states choose to create would not be created at all were certain
constitutional restrictions (e.g., one-person, one-vote) applied to them.
The affront to a state’s dignity from imposing a constitutional restriction
on one if its subdivisions reaches its greatest level in those instances
where the Court’s choice to impose a restriction would likely come at the
cost of destroying a particular type of government.67
Having identified, by using the lens of the Court’s comparative
inquiry, those relevant factors that likely would serve as proxies for the
Court’s Theoretical Inquiry, we can return to our imaginary, threedimensional graph. Recognizing that the comparative proxies we
identified are simply substitutes for our X, Y, and Z axis inquiries under
the pure Theoretical Inquiry allows us to recognize that we can roughly
“derive” the “zone of federalism” and “area of supremacy” on our
theoretical graph indirectly through our comparative inquiry. In other
words, by using the comparative proxy factors identified in the foregoing
paragraphs as substitutes for the X, Y, and Z axes labels under the pure
Theoretical Inquiry, we can plot the Court’s precedents that are relevant
to the current issue on the graph, creating an imaginary, threedimensional scatter plot. If we imagine that we “color” these points two
colors, one color representing circumstances in which the Court has
chosen to impose some sort of restriction, and the other color
representing those circumstances in which the Court has not chosen to do
66. This type of inquiry is illustrated in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), where the Court
spent a significant portion of its opinion trying to determine whether the local governmental entity at
issue was more like the governmental entity in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973), upon which the government had not chosen to impose one-person,
one-vote restrictions, or whether it was more like the governments on which it had imposed oneperson, one-vote restrictions in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970), and in other
similar cases.
67. Although not a Supreme Court case, the Second Circuit case of Kessler v. Grand Central
District Management Ass’n, Inc., 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998), referring to Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
355 (1981), suggested that this notion was implicit in the Court’s Ball opinion, noting that “the State
legislature could reasonably have concluded that property owners, unless given principal control
over how the money is spent, would not have consented to having their property subject to the
assessment.” Kessler, 158 F.3d at 108.
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so, then by connecting those points of similar color, we can “derive” a
rough estimate of the zone of federalism and area of supremacy. We can
then “plot” the current issue before the Court on this graph in order to
predict whether the Court will impose some sort of remedy in a particular
case.
In other words, to determine whether the Prong 1 presumption of
constitutionally permissible entity structuring has been overcome, the
Court simply determines whether the point it has drawn on the scatter
plot falls within or without the zone of federalism. If the presumption has
not been overcome (i.e., the point on the imaginary scatter plot falls
within the “zone of federalism”), the Court simply finds that there has
been no constitutional violation, dismissing the case. Therefore, if the
Court determines that the presumption under Prong 1 of the analysis has
not been overcome, the Court best respects the states by allowing them
free reign in structuring their local governments. If, on the other hand,
the Court determines that the Prong 1 presumption has been overcome
(i.e., the point on the imaginary scatter plot falls within the “area of
supremacy”), then the Court engages in Prong 2 of the inquiry regarding
the presumption.
While my description of the framework in the preceding paragraphs
might suggest that I am attempting to claim the ability to predict whether
a Court will or will not impose a remedy in future cases with
mathematical precision, I will be the first to disclaim any such notion. I
recognize that my proposed method does not offer mathematical
precision and that use of the proposed method will often produce
indeterminate results. Nonetheless, the method is valuable for several
reasons. First, by using the proposed Theoretical Inquiry as a lens
through which to view the actual comparative inquiry used by the Court,
we were able to attempt to identify those factors that are relevant to the
Court as it is engaging in its comparative inquiry,68 thus likely modestly

68. Although I believe that the factors I have identified are some of the factors driving the
Court’s analysis in the relevant case law, in reality the validity of my assertions regarding the dualfaceted federalism framework are not even directly dependent upon my having identified the correct
factors that are relevant to the Court as it engages in its inquiry. This is because my primary
assertion is simply that local governments enjoy only derivative status in the federal constitutional
hierarchy. In order to prove this point, I assert that federalism plays two roles in the Court’s
jurisprudence, (1) limiting the likelihood that a Court will find that a state has violated the
Constitution at all in structuring its local governments, and (2) counseling the Court, in
circumstances where it does impose some remedy, to limit its remedy so as to only minimally
interfere with state sovereignty. The more specific factors I have identified are simply intended to
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increasing the chance that any particular prediction will be correct. More
importantly, though, to the extent that this framework is accurate as a
descriptive matter, it allows me to suggest something important about the
constitutional status of local governments. Having reiterated my limited
purpose in articulating this descriptive framework, I move onward to
discuss Prong 2.
2. Framework Prong 2 – assessing the scope of the remedy
Under Prong 2 of the dual-faceted federalism framework, the Court
assesses what restriction it should place on a state subdivision. Although
the overcoming of the Prong 1 presumption necessitates the imposition
of some restriction, the federalism presumption nonetheless counsels the
Court to tailor its remedy as narrowly as possible. This tailoring ensures
that the Court’s interference with a state’s choices about structuring its
local governments is as minimally invasive as possible. Nevertheless,
just as federalism operates as a presumption under Prong 1 of the
inquiry, federalism once again acts merely as a presumption at Step 2,
not as an absolute bar on Court action. In particular, Prong 2 creates a
presumption of not ignoring those lines that states have chosen to draw
on the map (i.e., a presumption that the remedy will be geographically
tailored to the smallest possible offending area).
Mercifully, it is much easier to determine when the Prong 2
presumption has been rebutted. Instead of wading into the quagmire of
factors considered under Prong 1, the Prong 2 presumption is only
rebutted in a single circumstance. That circumstance occurs where the
evidence shows that the state has structured its municipalities so as to
purposefully violate individual rights. In such a circumstance, the Court
simply disregards the purposefully discriminatory decision. While
disregarding such a decision does not inevitably mean that the local
government itself is disregarded, this is often the result where the
offending state decision is to create or modify that local government.
This result makes good sense as a matter of policy. To the extent that
a state has acted purposefully in attempting to structure its subdivisions

buttress my assertion that federalism plays two roles in the relevant jurisprudence. Thus, as long as
the reader accepts my premise that one of the dual roles of federalism will be operative in a
particular case, it does not matter whether the reader accepts the particular factors that I have
identified.
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in a way that would deprive individuals of federally guaranteed
constitutional rights (for example, by drawing city boundary lines in a
manner intended to restrict minority voting rights),69 the state has shown
it is irresponsible and must be checked. After all, in addition to
protecting the states, as previously noted, federalism serves to protect
individual rights.70 On the other hand, if a state itself has not acted
purposefully to deprive individuals of certain constitutionally guaranteed
rights, the Court should feel more at liberty to constrain its remedy to the
particular state subdivision that has been guilty of infringement, because
the state itself has not shown that it is incapable or unwilling to safeguard
individual rights. In other words, federalism counsels a narrow remedy in
those cases where state actors have not acted purposefully, because, in
such cases, it is possible to protect the state from undue federal
interference while also adequately protecting individual rights. But,
where states have acted purposefully to deprive individuals of federal
constitutional rights, there is no legitimate reason to protect the states
from federal interference—the states’ actions are illegitimate, so the only
relevant federalism interest at stake is in protecting individual rights.
Having proposed this descriptive framework, I will now deploy it to
explain some of the Court’s relevant local government jurisprudence.
3. Application of the framework
While space and time constraints will not permit a comprehensive
presentation of all the relevant cases that might be discussed here, I
discuss four cases that allow for effective illustration of this Comment’s
proposed framework in action. Three of these cases—Hunter, Milliken,71
and Ball—were chosen because they each illustrate the three Briffault
conceptualizations of municipalities and also illustrate how the apparent
inconsistencies between these conceptualizations disappear when viewed
in light of this Comment’s proposed framework. The facts of these cases
were presented in Part II, so they should already be familiar to the reader.
The fourth of these cases—Gomillion—was chosen, because it illustrates
one of those relatively rare instances where both the Prong 1 and Prong 2
presumptions were overcome. This case was not discussed above in Part

69. See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
71. It is fortunate that this discussion of these four cases permits us to return to the paradigm
inconsistency used throughout this Comment—the inconsistency between Hunter and Milliken.
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II, so I provide more comprehensive discussion of its facts before
applying this Comment’s framework to the case.72
Together, these four cases will allow me to illustrate each of the
three possible outcomes under my proposed framework: (1) situations
where the Prong 1 presumption is not overcome, so no Prong 2 analysis
is necessary (Hunter and Ball); (2) situations where the Prong 1
presumption is overcome, but the Prong 2 presumption is not overcome
(Milliken); and (3) situations where both the Prong 1 and Prong 2
presumptions are overcome (Gomillion). Although in this Part I do not
comprehensively analyze all the cases previously discussed in Part II, in
footnotes that follow, I briefly suggest where these cases, along with
certain other cases, might fit.
Once again, before presenting these cases, I caution the reader that
although I do suggest relevant factors that the Court might have
considered in determining what type of role federalism would play in a
given case (e.g., whether it would play a Prong 1 or Prong 2 role), my
principal purpose is not to perfectly explain which individual factors are
relevant in the Court’s analysis. Rather, my primary purpose is to assert
that federalism occupies dual roles in the Court’s local government
jurisprudence. To the extent I am correct in this assertion, my theory that
local governments enjoy only derivative status in the constitutional
hierarchy will be corroborated.
a. Outcome number one: Prong 1 presumption not rebutted. The first
of three possible outcomes available under this Comment’s proposed
framework exists where the Prong 1 presumption is not overcome, such
that no Prong 2 analysis is necessary. Hunter and Ball effectively
illustrate this outcome. Although these cases apparently involve different
conceptualizations of municipalities, the cases are actually consistent
when viewed through the lens of this Comment’s proposed framework.
Recall that Hunter—a case that fits within the first of Briffault’s
three conceptualizations of municipalities—involved a situation where
the laws of Pennsylvania permitted the joining of two contiguous
municipalities based on a vote of the collective populations of both cities.
When the city of Pittsburgh tried to annex its contiguous neighbor,
Allegheny, the residents of Allegheny balked and brought suit. The

72. Gomillion was not presented in Part II, because I feel that it does not fit neatly into one of
Briffault’s three proposed conceptualizations.
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Supreme Court, using very strong language, rejected the residents’
challenge, suggesting that Allegheny could not sue to prevent the merger
because cities have no independent status in the constitutional
hierarchy.73
Ball, unlike Hunter, fits within the third of Briffault’s three
conceptualizations of municipalities. In Ball, the Court examined a oneperson, one-vote challenge involving a special improvement district
election. Voting within this district (the “Power District”) was limited to
certain property owners who owned sufficiently large tracts of land.
Although the Court had previously imposed one-person, one-vote
requirements on other local government elections, ultimately the Court
refused to apply any such restriction on the Power District.74
Thus, Hunter and Ball appeared to adopt different conceptualizations
of the constitutional status of local governments, because the Hunter
Court completely disregarded the city of Allegheny, whereas the Ball
Court recognized and respected the importance and existence of the
Power District. But both cases can be fully explained by noting that in
neither case was the constitutional case sufficiently compelling to justify
the imposition of any restriction on the state’s ability to freely structure
its municipalities (i.e., both cases involved Prong 1 of the proposed
federalism framework).
Although Hunter involved an entity (a city) that operated as a
general government, suggesting that the Court might have been more
likely to impose some sort of restriction in order to protect rights, the
particular right at issue was not a very compelling one. First of all, the
Court did not perceive the right at issue as an individual one, dismissing
the notion that individual residents of Allegheny had somehow acquired
vested rights in the existence of the city. Instead, the Court functionally
viewed the dispute as one directly between the local government and its
state. This was significant, because, although the Court previously had
imposed restrictions on the otherwise free ability of states to structure
their local governments based on the Contracts Clause, these cases had
involved assertions that individual rights (generally the rights of
creditors) were infringed on by the state action. By contrast, the Court
had previously held in City of Trenton and in Dartmouth College that the
Contracts Clause did not provide the same protection to municipal

73. See discussion supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
74. See discussion supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
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corporations that it did to private parties.75
Therefore, the Court’s conclusion that this case did not involve
individual rights, along with the Court’s earlier precedents suggesting
that there was minimal,if any,infringement of rights in analogous
situations, likely convinced the Court that the state should be free to
structure its municipalities in the manner it saw fit.76
The Ball Court reached a similar result, ultimately concluding that
the state should be permitted to structure its municipalities in the manner
it saw fit, although the case was likely a closer one. This is so because
the right at issue—voting—was a significant, individual right,
attributable to the Reconstruction Amendments that had already been
applied to the states and had previously been applied to other local
governments. Nevertheless, unlike Hunter, Ball did not involve a general
purpose government, but instead involved a special purpose district. This
special purpose government exercised relatively limited and arguably
insignificant powers. This special purpose district originally had been
created as a private entity, and had only been converted into a quasipublic entity to take advantage of certain financial benefits available to
such entities. Furthermore, when the Court previously examined whether
to apply the same restriction (one-person, one-vote) to a similar local
government entity in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District77 the Court concluded that the specific right at issue—
the right to vote—was inapplicable, thus suggesting that the Court had
already determined that applying such a right to this type of entity might
trammel significantly upon such entities because states might no longer
create them. Therefore, although the right at issue was an important one,
the Court likely concluded that the right would not significantly be

75. This previously settled law—derived from City of Trenton and Dartmouth College—
regarding the ability of states to freely structure their municipalities explains why, absent an
allegation that the state’s structuring of local governments was intended to deprive individuals of
constitutionally guaranteed rights, city challenges to state action under the Contracts Clause
generally do not overcome the presumption of constitutionality under Prong 1 of the dual-faceted
federalism framework.
76. If we imagine that we plot the unique facts of Hunter as a single point on our
hypothetical, three-dimensional graph that was examined as part of this Comment’s presentation of
the proposed framework above, along with the Court’s prior relevant precedents, including City of
Trenton and Dartmouth College, the point representing Hunter probably falls well within the “zone
of federalism.” Thus, this signals to us that it was probably quite easy for the Court to conclude that
the state was permitted to do what it had done.
77. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
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compromised in this instance, particularly given that no evidence showed
that the government entity at issue had been purposefully designed to
deprive individuals of certain rights. Therefore, although the case was
likely a closer one than Hunter,78 ultimately the Ball Court determined
that the relative balance between federalism and supremacy tilted in
favor of federalism. Consequently, the Court chose not to restrict the
state’s autonomy in structuring the Power District.
In light of the foregoing, the apparent disparity between Ball and
Hunter is consistent with this Comment’s primary thesis that the
constitutional status of local governments is derivative, not nonexistent
or independent. In other words, the reason the local government at issue
in Hunter was disregarded was that the state wanted it to be disregarded.
After all, Pennsylvania had passed a statute permitting the joining of two
contiguous cities based upon a popular vote of the two cities’ collective
population. Accordingly, allowing the destruction of the city was
consistent with the state’s wishes. On the other hand, in Ball, the state
had chosen to permit the creation of local special improvement districts.
In that case, respecting the existence of this local government was also
consistent with the state’s wishes, because the district had been created in
accordance with state law. Therefore, in the absence of any constitutional
restriction, the relevant local government entities simply assumed
derivative roles under the Court’s jurisprudence that allowed the Court to
respect the states’ intents regarding their local governments.79

78. Once again, if we imagine that we plot the unique facts of Ball on our hypothetical, threedimensional graph, the results are more equivocal. This is because the Court had already imposed
the same restriction on other local governments previously, and the right at issue was an important
one. Furthermore, although the Court had not imposed such a restriction in Salyer, that case involved
an entity that exercised powers that were far less significant in scope. Thus, the point on our graph
representing the unique facts of Ball likely fell near the border between the “zone of federalism” and
the “area of supremacy.”
79. See also City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) (sustaining New Jersey’s
attempt to collect a license fee for water that the City of Trenton was diverting from the Delaware
river); City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919) (upholding a state law
giving a state commission the power to regulate public utilities even though the law conflicted with a
city’s prior franchise agreement with the state giving the city exclusive authority to regulate the
utilities because this was “no question under the contract clause of the Constitution of the United
States . . . but only a question of local law” and the state was free to change the agreement at will);
New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891) (upholding Louisiana’s
imposition of a tax on a New Orleans city water company in the face of a claim that the tax impaired
a contract between Louisiana and New Orleans giving the city the ability to freely use certain water
because there was no such contract and the state was free to engage in such regulation); East
Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. 511 (1850) (holding that because the city of East Hartford
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b. Outcome number two: Prong 1 presumption rebutted, but Prong 2
presumption not rebutted. Milliken is an example of the second possible
outcome under our proposed framework—where the Prong 1
presumption is overcome, but the Prong 2 presumption is not. This
Section’s discussion of Milliken is significant because it allows for the
appropriate reconciliation of the paradigm example of inconsistency used
throughout this Comment—the inconsistency between Milliken and
Hunter.
As previously noted, Milliken involved a claim that the Detroit
metropolitan area school districts had engaged in impermissible racial
discrimination. The plaintiffs sought a remedy that would span the entire
metro area. Nevertheless, the Court, while finding a violation within a
single district, refused to extend the busing remedy sought beyond those
district lines even though doing so would make the remedy more
effective, noting that there was no evidence that the state itself had
engaged in purposeful discrimination in the drawing of district lines.
Applying our framework to the school district at issue in Milliken is
instructive, because it suggests why the Court chose to impose a remedy
but limited it to a single school district. Under Prong 1 of the inquiry, it
is important to note that the right at issue—the right to attend a unitary
school district—was one that the Court had judicially enforced in the
past,80 sometimes by mandating busing. Thus, the Court had previously

was nothing more than a subdivision of Connecticut, the city could not bring a claim against the
State challenging as a violation of the Contracts Clause the State’s choice to forbid the city from
continuing to operate a ferry after a bridge had been opened).
A number of cases in which individuals have asserted that they have the right to vote in local
government elections have also led the Court to respect state decisions about how to structure their
municipalities. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978); Dusch v. Davis,
387 U.S. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
Some of the Court’s zoning decisions also fit within this category. See Vill. of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (sustaining a local zoning restriction of a “village on Long Island’s north
shore” with “about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people” that limited the number of unrelated
individuals who could live together in a single household).
80. The Court in Milliken clearly recognized this, noting that
[t]he target of the Brown holding was clear and forthright: the elimination of
state-mandated or deliberately maintained dual school systems with certain
schools for Negro pupils and others for white pupils. This duality and racial
segregation were held to violate the Constitution in the cases subsequent to
1954, including particularly Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443
(1968); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Wright v.
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imposed restrictions on other local government entities, including other
entities of the exact same type (school districts) to protect the right to
attend unitary districts. Furthermore, the right at issue was an individual
right protected under one of the Reconstruction Amendments.
Additionally, although school districts are not general purpose
governments, they exercise significant powers within their relatively
constrained sphere of influence (education). Furthermore, their
significant efforts are thought to be public serving and to have broad
societal ramifications. Taken together, these and other relevant
considerations likely led the Court to conclude that it needed to impose
some remedy. In other words, the Prong 1 presumption was overcome.
Nevertheless, the Court still had to decide the scope of its remedy.
After all, the Court’s concern for federalism does not dissipate simply
because it finds a constitutional violation. Rather, this concern continues
to inform the Court’s Prong 2 analysis, counseling the Court to limit its
remedy as much as possible—as long as the state has not acted
purposefully to deprive individuals of their constitutionally guaranteed
rights. In Milliken, the Court clearly noted that there had been no such
purposeful behavior on the part of Michigan.81 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the Prong 2 presumption had not been overcome, and the
Court limited its remedy to only a single school district, instead of
imposing a broader remedy that might have been more effective. Thus,
through refusing to impose a metropolitan-area-wide remedy, the Court
protected federalism82 by respecting—to the extent possible—the way in
Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v.
Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737 (1974).
81. In fact, in framing the issue before it, the Court noted that the issue was “whether a
federal court may impose a multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single-district de jure segregation
problem absent any finding that the other included school districts have failed to operate unitary
school systems within their districts, absent any claim or finding that the boundary lines of any
affected school district were established with the purpose of fostering racial segregation in public
schools . . . .” Id. at 721 (emphasis added).
82. Justice White’s dissent made explicit the notion that the Court had chosen to impose a
remedy that Justice White deemed ineffective out of solicitude for the state. See id. at 763 (White, J.,
dissenting) (“Regretfully, and for several reasons, I can join neither the Court’s judgment nor its
opinion. The core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation and their consequences
will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of the usual
criteria governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause what the
Court considers to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State. The result is that the State of
Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated itself
from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its public
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which the state had chosen to draw its school district boundaries.
This discussion of how the dual-faceted federalism framework
applies to Milliken also permits resolution of the apparent conflict
between Milliken and Hunter—the paradigm example of apparent
inconsistency utilized throughout this Comment. As mentioned, the bare
recognition of federalism’s role in both cases was insufficient to explain
this inconsistency because it did not explain why the Hunter court
imposed no remedy, whereas the Milliken Court imposed one. This core
distinction between the cases, however, is fully and easily explained by
noting that Hunter is a case that fell under Prong 1 of the proposed
framework, whereas Milliken instead fell under Prong 2. Thus, while
federalism played a role in each case, it played a slightly different role in
each one. In Hunter, the Court’s determination that there had been no
constitutional violation, along with the fact that state law suggested that
it wanted Allegheny to have no constitutional status, led the Court to
completely respect the state’s decision regarding its local government
subdivision. Conversely, in Milliken, the Court concluded that some
remedy needed to be imposed to protect important constitutional rights,
but still gave the maximum deference possible to the state’s decisions by
choosing to limit its remedy to only a single school district. While this
second, Milliken-type situation might create the illusion that the Court is
recognizing the “independent” status and importance of local
governments, this status is in fact only derivative. The Court chose to
give maximum possible force to the state’s structuring decisions by
“recognizing” the local government at issue.83
schools in its local school districts. If this is the case in Michigan, it will be the case in most
States.”).
83. Other relevant decisions fitting into this category include many of the cases in which the
Court has imposed one-person, one-vote restrictions. These cases do not provide the same dramatic
illustration that Milliken does of the role that federalism plays in the Court’s decisions about
tailoring its remedies once it decides to impose them, since the scope of the necessary remedy in
one-person, one-vote cases always relates only to the particular local government before the Court.
Nevertheless, in all these cases it is nonetheless true that the one-person, one-vote remedy is only
applied to the particular local government entity before the Court. Thus, the Court implicitly accepts
both the fact that these local governments exist and the notion that such governments are a
permissible means by which to apportion state governmental power, despite the fact that, if a
comparison was made between different cities or different counties, one person’s vote in a small
county election might be worth much more than one person’s vote in a county with a substantially
larger population. Thus, these cases imposing one-person, one-vote show solicitude for state
decisions more implicitly, by never questioning the use of counties and cities to divide up political
power in the states. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (imposing oneperson, one-vote requirements in a municipal bond election); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S.
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c. Outcome number three: Prong 1 and Prong 2 presumptions
rebutted. The third possible outcome under this Comment’s framework
exists where both the Prong 1 and Prong 2 presumptions are overcome.
The most instructive example of this outcome is Gomillion v. Lightfoot.84
In Gomillion, the Court heard a challenge to the constitutional validity of
an Alabama state law that redrew the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee.
The petitioners were a group of black individuals whose residences
had—prior to this redistricting—been within the boundaries of
Tuskegee.85 Following the redistricting, they were no longer residents of
the city, and they alleged that this redistricting had violated their
constitutionally guaranteed rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, including the right to vote.86 In the district court, the
respondents had alleged that the court had “no control over, no
supervision over, and no power to change any boundaries of municipal
corporations fixed by a duly convened and elected legislative body,
acting for the people in the State of Alabama.”87 The district court had

50 (1970) (imposing a one-person, one-vote requirement on an election for a junior college district
board of trustees because the board “perform[ed] important governmental functions” and its “powers
[were] general enough and ha[d] sufficient impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion”
that one-person, one-vote should apply); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621
(1969) (imposing one-person, one-vote restrictions in the election of a school district board); Avery
v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (imposing one-person, one-vote requirements on a single
Texas county).
Some of the Court’s zoning decisions also fit within this category. See Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (imposing the requirement that any community with any area
zoned for commercial use must include an area for adult businesses); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down a zoning ordinance that restricted the ability of certain extended
family members to live with one another). Although, just like the one-person, one-vote decisions,
these zoning decisions do not dramatically illustrate the role that federalism plays as the Court
determines the scope of the remedy it will impose, I believe that it is nonetheless implicit within
these decisions. This is because in both cases the Court implicitly accepts the permissibility of
having local governments exercising zoning authority. This authority is never questioned despite the
fact that the Court concluded, in both cases, that the local governments abused their authority.
Although it could, at least hypothetically, be argued that local governments are too irresponsible to
be given such authority, such an argument would seem completely antithetical to federalism and to
the principle that states should be able to structure their internal affairs at will. The fact that these
arguments are not made, however, suggests that the Court implicitly recognizes the derivative status
of local governments, imposing restrictions on these local governments because the states have
chosen to delegate substantial power to them.
84. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
85. Id. at 340.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 340–41 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1958)).
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agreed, granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss.88 Although the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, the Court, in a majority opinion delivered by Justice
Frankfurter, reversed, holding that if their allegations were true, the
petitioners’ Fifteenth Amendment rights had been violated by this
legislative redistricting.89
The Court explained that the case raised “serious questions . . .
concerning the power of a State over its municipalities in relation to the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”90 The Court noted that the
redistricting that had taken place had changed the shape of the city from
a “square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure,” and that this
redistricting had “remove[d] from the city all save four or five of its 400
Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resident,”
thereby “depriv[ing] the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the
benefits of residence in Tuskegee.”91 The Court reasoned that “the
legislation [was] solely concerned with segregating white and colored
voters,” and noted that there was no “countervailing municipal function
which [the Act was] designed to serve.”92
While the Gomillion Court noted that the respondents had cited to
Hunter for the proposition that a state had “unrestricted power—
unlimited, that is, by the United States Constitution—to establish,
destroy, or reorganize by contraction or expansion its political
subdivisions” and the Court “freely recognize[d] the breadth and
importance of this aspect of the State’s political power,” the Court
nonetheless rejected this assertion, noting that “[t]o exalt this power into
an absolute is to misconceive the reach and rule of this Court’s decisions
in the leading case of Hunter” and other similar cases.93 Likely

88. Id. at 340.
89. Id. at 346.
90. Id. at 341.
91. Id. at 340–41.
92. Id. at 341–42.
93. Id. at 342. In an attempt to distinguish these cases and their “seemingly unconfined
dicta,” the Court explained that these earlier cases simply stood for the proposition that “the State’s
authority [was] unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution considered in those
cases,” not that “the State has plenary power to manipulate in every conceivable way, for every
conceivable purpose, the affairs of its municipal corporations.” Id. at 344. While it would certainly
be convenient if Frankfurter’s assertion that the particular constitutional provision at issue in a given
case is determinative of whether the Court will choose to impose a restriction on a state’s free ability
to structure its municipalities in the manner it sees fit were true, later cases, particularly later oneperson one-vote cases, suggest that this assertion does not provide a plenary explanation, see supra
note 20. On the other hand, the framework presented by this Comment does provide a cohesive

1624

4.CANNON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1585

2/8/2013 2:57 PM

A Federalism Framework and Local Governments

recognizing that, given the strong language of Hunter and similar
opinions, it would be somewhat difficult to distinguish these cases,
Frankfurter further attempted to buttress the Court’s opinion. First, he
noted that other cases had “refused to allow a State to abolish a
municipality . . . without preserving to the creditors of the old city some
effective recourse for the collection of debts owed them.”94 These cases,
the Court reasoned, “conclusively show[ed] that the Court ha[d] never
acknowledged that the States have power to do as they will with
municipal corporations regardless of consequences,” since state control
of municipal corporations fell “within the scope of relevant limitations
imposed by the United States Constitution.”95 Second, Frankfurter
attempted to persuasively distinguish Colegrove v. Green, an opinion he
had previously written for the Court that had involved the same right at
issue in Gomillion—voting—but had reached the opposite result, holding
that legislative districting was a political question unreviewable by the
Court.96 Frankfurter argued that Colegrove was different, because it had
involved legislative inaction, as opposed to “affirmative legislative
action,” noting that “[w]hen a legislature . . . singles out a readily
isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment,
it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”97 He stated that here “the Alabama
Legislature has not merely redrawn the Tuskegee city limits with
incidental inconvenience to the petitioners; it is more accurate to say that
it has deprived the petitioners of the municipal franchise and consequent
rights and to that end it has incidentally changed the city’s boundaries.”98
Applying this Comment’s proposed framework to Gomillion
demonstrates why the Court reached this conclusion. Under the Prong 1
presumption, the Court might have considered that the local government
at issue was a general municipal government that exercised broad,
significant, and important powers. Furthermore, the right at issue—
framed by the Court as the right to vote under the Fifteenth
Amendment99—was a significant, individual right guaranteed by the
Reconstruction Amendments. Additionally, and perhaps of greater

explanation for these cases.
94. Id. at 344.
95. Id. at 344–45.
96. Id. at 346.
97. Id. at 346.
98. Id. at 347.
99. Id. at 345.
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significance, the evidence strongly suggested that the state had attempted
to purposefully deprive individuals of this right; after all, the boundaries
of the city had been changed by legislative fiat from a “square to an
uncouth, twenty-eight sided figure.”100 This purposeful discrimination
signaled that state political channels would not likely provide effective
recourse for vindication of those individual rights. In other words, the
state had used its powers to directly infringe upon important,
constitutionally guaranteed rights in a situation involving a generalpurpose government that exercised significant power and influence.
Thus, it was probably easy for the Court to conclude that the Prong 1
presumption was overcome and that the Court needed to impose some
remedy. Furthermore, while the Court’s Prong 2 analysis generally
would caution the Court to limit its remedy as much as possible, the
Gomillion evidence overwhelmingly suggested that the state had acted
purposefully to deprive certain individuals of constitutionally guaranteed
rights.101 In light of this, the Prong 2 presumption was also overcome.
Thus, the Court was free to completely disregard the state’s decision
about how to structure Tuskegee. Consequently, the Court effectively
redrew the city boundary lines that the state had drawn on the map.102

100. Id. at 340.
101. Id. at 346.
102. Another case that seems to fit within this category is Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996). Romer involved a challenge to a Colorado constitutional amendment that banned any
governmental action designed to protect homosexuals. Id. at 623–24. This amendment was passed by
referendum in response to antidiscrimination ordinances protecting homosexuals that had been
passed in various Colorado municipalities. Id. at 624. The Court, in a somewhat confusing opinion
by Justice Kennedy, held that the constitutional amendment violated the equal protection clause. Id.
at 635–36. Although the state argued, in defense of the amendment, that it did not discriminate
against homosexuals, because it did no more than put them in the same position as all others, the
Court rejected this conclusion, noting that this put “[h]omosexuals, by state decree . . . in a solitary
class with respect to transactions and relations . . . withdraw[ing] from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of
these laws and policies.” Id. at 627. It noted that this amendment imposed a “special disability” on
homosexuals since they were “forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without
constraint.” Id. at 631. Kennedy asserted that the protections that homosexuals could not seek
because of Colorado’s amendment involved “protections taken for granted by most people either
because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an
almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free
society.” Id. Thus, the purposeful discriminatory action at issue in Romer seemed to lead the Court
to conclude that it needed to disregard the particular state local government structuring decision at
issue. Interestingly, doing so ultimately led the Court to augment the power of the local government.
Notably, however, the Court did not suggest that it would have been impermissible for the state to
have completely removed power to pass antidiscrimination legislation from its local governments in
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What does the Court’s choice to redraw the lines at issue in
Gomillion suggest? On the one hand, it might suggest that the Court
viewed the municipality as having some independent importance in the
constitutional hierarchy, thereby justifying the imposition of a remedy.
However, the error of this view is easily revealed by imagining what the
Court’s decision might have been had the state, instead of merely
modifying government lines along impermissible but nondiscriminatory
grounds, had purposefully incorporated a city along racially
discriminatory lines. In such a situation, the Court would have chosen to
override the state’s decision, just like the Court chose to override the
state’s decision in Milliken.103 However, the result would not have been
respect for a local government. Rather, the result would have been a local
government’s destruction. In other words, a local government is only
respected where the choices leading to the creation of that local
government were legitimate, thus suggesting that that the status of local
governments is merely derivative. Consequently, decisions about the
creation and modification of such entities rise and fall on the
constitutional legitimacy of the underlying state decisions, not on the

a nondiscriminatory fashion, thus suggesting solicitude for state decisions.
Similarly, yet another relevant case of this type is Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,
458 U.S. 457 (1982), which involved a challenge to a state statute that prohibited local school boards
from busing students in order to promote desegregation. Id. at 461–63. Instead of sustaining this
restriction on local government power as permissible, the Court held that the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 476–77. The Court reasoned that the shifting of authority to
determine when and whether busing was permitted from the local to the state government had
“worked a major reordering of the State’s educational decisionmaking process,” id. at 479, and that
this decision had been made on the impermissible basis of race, id. at 485–87. Given that, in general,
the local school board retained most authority for making educational decisions, this limited cutting
away of local authority on impermissible grounds was held to be invalid. Id. at 479–80.
Critically, in both Romer and Seattle School District, because the states’ impermissible
decisions only dealt with the states’ decisions to take away a particular power from their local
government entities, the Court’s conclusions that the states’ actions were impermissible did not lead
the Court to conclude that it had to disregard the local governments at issue. This is so, because the
states’ impermissible decisions in these cases were not their decisions to create the municipalities or
to redraw their boundaries. These decisions had been permissible. Rather, the Court merely had to
reverse the states’ purposeful decisions to restrict the powers of their local governments in a
discriminatory fashion. Thus, in both cases, the Court, functionally, ultimately augmented the power
of the local governments at issue.
103. This is apparently what happened in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), where the Court held that it was a violation of the
Establishment Clause for the State of New York to create a special school district to serve
handicapped children of the “Satmar Hasidim,” a group comprised of “practitioners of a strict form
of Judaism.” Id. at 690.
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underlying importance of the local governments. Thus, even this
relatively rare third category of cases suggests that the status of local
governments is merely derivative.
Having explored each of the different possibilities under this
Comment’s proposed framework, I close with a brief section
summarizing this Comment’s implications.
V. IMPLICATIONS
As noted at the outset, this Comment’s proposed framework has four
principal implications.
First, the framework helps identify some of the factors that the Court
uses in determining whether constitutional restrictions should apply to
particular state decisions about how to structure their local governments.
These factors should lead to somewhat improved predictability of the
outcome of future cases in this area, although the minutia of my
framework are almost certainly both imperfect and nonexhaustive.
Second, and more importantly, my proposed dual-faceted framework
helps identify the constitutional status of local governments by
illustrating the nuanced, dual-faceted role that federalism plays in this
area of jurisprudence. Recognizing federalism’s dual role demonstrates
that it is most appropriate to conceive of local governments as enjoying
merely derivative constitutional status, as opposed to independent or
nonexistent status. This further suggests that the emerging localism
scholars are incorrect in their assertions that the Court has an emerging
awareness of the importance of local governments.
Third, because the apparent consistency and transparency of the
Court’s past jurisprudence is enhanced by explicit recognition of the
multifaceted role federalism plays, the Court should make more explicit
the role federalism plays in its jurisprudence. This explicit recognition
would clarify that local governments enjoy only derivative status.
Finally, this Comment contributes to the relevant literature by adding
greater descriptive clarity to what the Court actually is doing. This
improved descriptive clarity paves the way for future work that could
more thoroughly examine whether this derivative status is normatively
desirable, or whether it would be superior to adopt some alternative
regime that afforded certain independent status to such local
governments.
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